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                                Introduction 
I.  Background 
 Tensions in the city had rapidly grown over several months.  On a wintry night in early 
March, 1770, a sentry and a civilian exchanged insults over a seemingly trivial matter, a disputed 
lodging bill.  Soon, protests mounted as a soldier shoved a young boy.  With the sounds of 
church bells ringing through the night, events quickly spiraled out of control as an angry armed 
mob confronted the sentry and the eight other soldiers who had come to his assistance. Rocks 
and snowballs rained down on the soldiers; British muskets fired into the crowd.  When the 
smoke cleared, three civilians were left on the ground, dead. 
  Public outrage over the “Boston Massacre” culminated in a tense trial of the British 
soldiers for murder.  In a politically charged courtroom, the defense was led by John Adams and 
Josiah Quincy, the most prominent Boston lawyers of the day.  Facing an enraged public seeking 
revenge, they invoked the names of jurists and philosophers of the past to assert that the soldiers 
possessed a fundamental right of self- preservation. “It is the first, and strongest principle in our 
nature… the primary canon in the law of nature!”1 proclaimed John Adams to the jury. 
  The trial highlighted the question; “Under what circumstances may one defend oneself 
by shooting an assailant?”  By studying the arguments made by the lawyers representing both 
sides in the case, we can look back upon the English antecedents of this right, both from the 
standpoint of English political philosophers who first expounded it and the English common law  
																																																						
1 John Adams, Legal Papers of John Adams, vol. 3 https://www.masshist.org/publications 
(accessed May 25, 2019). 
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precedents that supported it.  The right of self- defense is also inextricably intertwined with the 
right to bear arms.  We can also study the trial to gain insight into the historical environment 
which shaped how the founding fathers interpreted an individual right to keep and bear arms.  
   The attorneys cited English political theorists and English common law precedent as 
authority for the proposition that a shooting in self-defense was justifiable.2  Both attorneys 
reached back to legal authorities from the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries by citing 
English jurists, Sir Matthew Hale, Sir William Hawkins, and Sir William Blackstone, authorities 
both numerous and widely recognized.  The right of self-defense was not only asserted by the 
defense. The prosecution also used the same authorities to justify the actions of the armed 
colonists who were portrayed not as a mob but as the embodiment of the noble “armed citizen” 
so often invoked by Whig political theorists of the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
England.   Clearly, in later eighteenth century colonial America, the proposition that one may 
arm oneself in personal self- defense had found support in not only the “Boston Massacre” 
courtroom, but among the public at large.  The two sets of arguments to the jury would have 
made no sense otherwise. 
 These authorities were not obscure names pulled from dusty treatises only known to the 
elite few. The works of John Locke and William Blackstone were widely disseminated in the 
colonies and were well known to the general public.3  The founding fathers stocked their libraries  
																																																						
2	“Adams’ Argument for the Defense,” 3-4 December 1770,” Founders Online, The Papers of 
John Adams, https://Founders.archives.gov/ (accessed February 12, 2019). 
3 Blackstone’s Commentaries were immensely popular in the colonies because it had particular 
appeal to the layman; justices of the peace and other local officials frequently referred to it in 
order to become conversant in the common law.  It allowed ordinary citizens to familiarize 
themselves with criminal law.  The Commentaries received most acclaim in thinly settled 
colonial America. Julius S. Waterman, “Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’s Commentaries,” in 
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with their treatises, as well as the writings of the Whig political theorists including James 
Harrington, Algernon Sydney, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon; men who helped shape the 
founders’ view of the role of the armed citizen as a bulwark for liberty against a tyrannical 
government. Thus, by studying this trial, we can analyze both the English precedents for the right 
to keep and bear arms as well as gain a greater understanding of the profound influence that 
these English writers had upon the founding fathers’ view of this right.   
  The exact nature of the right to keep and bear arms has been at the core of historical and 
legal debate for over two hundred years.  Is it a collective right inextricably linked to military 
service in an anachronistic militia?  Is it a private right to keep arms for the purpose of self-
defense?  Does the correct interpretation lie somewhere in between?  In the case, District of 
Columbia v. Heller (2008),4 the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly held that the Second Amendment 
protects an individual’s right to possess a firearm for traditional lawful purposes such as self-
defense in the home.  The fact that four Supreme Court justices dissented from this view 
suggests that the constitutional issue is far from settled. 
 While there has been a prodigious amount of research devoted to the American side of 
the constitutional right to bear arms, a much smaller group of historians has explored the English 
development of the right.  English historiography similarly divides over the question of whether 
the right is held by the individual, irrespective of military service, or whether it is a collective 
right.  The most comprehensive examination of the English right to bear arms is Joyce Lee  
 
																																																						
Essays in The History Of Early American Law, ed., David H. Flaherty (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1969): 454. 
4 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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Malcolm’s To Keep And Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right.5  Malcolm traces 
the development of the right during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, concluding that the 
English right belonged to the individual, regardless of a connection to military service.   Lois G. 
Schwoerer, in, The Declaration of Rights, 1689 and Gun Culture in Early Modern England, and 
in several articles, disputes Malcolm’s conclusions, finding that the individual right to hold and 
bear arms was so limited by law and class restrictions as to render it insignificant.  Other 
historians have viewed the development of the English right from the vantage point of a 
collective right – as a symbol of a political independence and as a deterrent to the abuse of 
liberties by a tyrannical power.  Lawrence Delbert Cress focused part of his research upon the 
political treatises and essays of the radical Whig writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.6  Steven Heyman, examining the political and legal treatises of John Locke and 
William Blackstone, concluded that the right was collective rather than individual.7  This paper 
will analyze how the historical development of the right of self-defense in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century England resulted in the recognition of an individual right to bear arms.  In 
particular, it will show how the founding fathers were influenced by English political and legal 
theorists who first articulated this right, adopting it as their own and acknowledging the debt.   
																																																						
5 Joyce Lee Malcolm, To Keep And Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
6 See Lawrence Delbert Cress, “An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right 
to Bear Arms,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 71, No. 1 (Jun. 1984) p. 22-42; Lawrence 
Delbert Cress, “Radical Whiggery on the Role of the Military: Ideological Roots of the 
American Revolutionary Militia,” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Jan. – Mar., 
1979) p. 43-60. 
7 Steven J. Heyman, “Natural Rights and the Second Amendment,” in Carl T. Bogus, ed., The 
Second Amendment in Law and History: Historians and Constitutional Scholars on the Right to 
Bear Arms, (New York: The New Press, 2000). 
	 	
            5 
II.  Gun Ownership in Colonial America 
 Crucial to the question is the degree of gun ownership in seventeenth- and eighteenth- 
century colonial America, which has become a subject of a considerable debate in recent years.   
Some studies argue that eighteenth century gun ownership was quite common and supported a 
robust militia structure, others that it was prevalent but that the militia was in decline during the 
course of the century.  One historian has posited that the extent of gun ownership was actually 
quite small.8  The lack of consensus on this issue may be attributable to the difficulty of 
acquiring and interpreting the data upon which the conclusions were drawn. Most studies rely on 
militia strength returns, gun censuses, and probate records, all of which have provided a wealth 
of information regarding the level of ownership by both members of the militia and the general 
population.  Yet each have limitations.    Militia strength returns offer a tabulation of men at each 
rank and the arms and ammunition in their possession.9 They indicate the extent of gun 
possession among the militiamen, but often fail to differentiate between firearms provided by the 
local government and those already in the possession of the militiamen. They also record arms 
possession by younger, poorer men, who were often under-represented in probate inventories.10    
Local officials visiting homes and businesses also compiled lists of able-bodied men in the  
																																																						
8 In his book, Arming America: The Origins of a National Gun Culture (New York, 2000), 
Professor Michael A. Bellesiles stoked controversy with his study that found that gun ownership 
in colonial America was actually rare; no more than 15 percent of the population owned guns.  
This study was later discredited as it was found to be based upon a biased interpretation of data, 
and in some instances, actual fraud. See Stanley N. Katz, Hannah H. Gray, and Laurel Thatcher 
Ulrich, “Report of the Investigative Committee in the Matter of Professor Michael Bellesiles,” 
July 10, 2002, https://www.emory.edu (accessed July 25, 2019).  
9 Robert H. Churchill. “Gun Ownership in Early America: A Survey of Manuscript Militia 
Returns” The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol 60, No 3 (Jul., 2003) 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.shu.edu (accessed February 23, 2019): 616. 
10 ibid., 616. 
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community and all firearms in their possession.11  Probate records likewise provide information 
regarding gun ownership.  They are quite useful because they focus on gun ownership beyond 
the ambit of militia service.  However, they have two significant limitations.  First, these records 
focus upon a smaller segment of the population; only the relatively wealthy and older would 
have wills and possess probate estates.  They tell us nothing about the level of gun ownership by 
the younger and poorer segment of the population. Secondly, possession of a firearm was often 
viewed as so commonplace as not to be separately listed in the probate inventories but buried, 
rather, in the general category of other personal property, such as “in small things forgotten.”12   
These records also suffered from the limitation that they did not consider the level of gun 
ownership by slaves, free blacks and women.  Recent studies have sought to overcome these 
limitations by using the varying types of records to supplement each other. 
 In a recent study, Robert H. Churchill analyzed all the sources to conclude that gun 
ownership in colonial America, while varying from region to region even within a single colony, 
was quite common. He found that the Northeast had levels of ownership of approximately 75 
percent by the time of the revolution. The level of armament in the Middle Atlantic was also 
high.13  As might be expected, regions along the frontier had the greatest percentage of gun 
ownership, based on the need for defense.  For example, Piedmont in Virginia had a very low 
percentage of ownership due to the efforts of the government to buy guns for public use.  The 
effort was concentrated in the Piedmont because the region was relatively safe from invasion.   
																																																						
11 ibid., 620. 
12 Gloria L. Main, “Many Things Forgotten: The Use of Probate Records in Arming America,” 
The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jan., 2002). 
http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.shu.edu (accessed February 24, 2019): 211. 
13 Churchill, “Gun Ownership in Early America,” 635. 
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While recognizing that there were gaps in the data due to the age of the archives, Churchill 
concluded that guns were quite prevalent for a multitude of uses: defense of person and property, 
hunting, defense of the frontier, and for service in the local militia.   
  Kevin M. Sweeney also reviewed probate inventories, militia returns, census data and 
other correspondence in his study of gun ownership in colonial America.  Spanning the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, he concluded that while the level of gun ownership was 
high, the participation rate in militias actually declined during the eighteenth century.  Outside 
the Delaware Valley, he wrote, “gun ownership appears to have been very common during the 
1600’s and remained widespread during the 1700’s”14   His study illuminatingly focuses not only 
on the extent of gun ownership but on the types of weapons favored by the colonials. 
 The diversity of the weaponry suggests ownership for a multitude of non-military uses.  
The iconic image of the Minute Man farmer carrying his musket into battle is a mis- 
representation.  Although the typical British heavy, large caliber musket was preferred for 
military use, colonists, as a rule, preferred guns better suited to hunting, pest control, and self-
defense.15  These tended to be lighter firearms, including flintlock fowlers and birding pieces.16  
In the early eighteenth century, the overwhelming majority of these weapons were imported, 
being few gunsmiths in America.  Arms making in America at that time consisted mainly of  
 
																																																						
14 Kevin M. Sweeney, “Firearms, Militias, and the Second Amendment,” appearing in The 
Second Amendment on Trial: Critical Essays on District of Columbia v. Heller, Saul Cornell, 
Nathan Kozuskanich, eds., (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013) 
https://www.jstor.org/stable (accessed May 30, 2019): 312. 
15 ibid., 312. 
16 ibid., 316. 
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assembling old or salvaged parts.17  Thus, the ownership of guns was motivated for use in 
hunting and self-defense, interests separate and apart from that of the military. 
 Demand for hunting weapons was high given the nature of life in eighteenth century 
colonial America. The majority of people lived on farms.  Only five percent of the population in 
America in 1750 lived in cities, none of which exceeded sixteen thousand people.18  In addition, 
gun ownership was actively encouraged as seventeenth- and eighteenth-century statutes often 
required militia men to possess their own weapons. Militia service was compulsory, with well 
over six hundred laws passed by colonial and state governments during this period.19  Typical of 
these statutes, a Maryland law passed in 1649 required a master of a family to provide “every 
hired servant or other sojourner also residing and dwelling in his house with one fixed gun, two 
pounds of powder, and eight pounds of shot.”20  The prevalence of firearms may also be 
attributable to the fact that they were affordable.  The cost of a firearm ranged from £1 -1.5, 
whereas the cost of a cow was approximately £3.21  Gun ownership was thus motivated by the 
need for defense and survival, the requirements of the local governments, and affordability. 
 As with ownership, the prevalence of the number of gunsmiths in colonial America has 
also been the subject of recent debate.  Much of the difficulty in identifying the number of 
gunsmiths relates to the incompleteness of records and the fact that many artisans performed dual 
functions in the colonial economy.  Gunsmiths were first and foremost blacksmiths.  
																																																						
17 Tom Grinslade, “Eighteenth Century American Fowlers – The First Guns Made In America,” 
American Society of Arms Collectors Bulletin 89:1-9, 
http://americansocietyofarmscollectors.org/resources/articles (accessed March 5, 2019).																	
18 ibid., 1. 
19 Sweeney, “Firearms, Militias, and the Second Amendment,” 311. 
20 ibid, 314. 
21 ibid., 314. 
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Consequently, it is difficult to establish the exact number of gunsmiths.22  It is clear, however, 
that at the beginning of the eighteenth century, virtually all guns were imported; the American 
colonies suffered a chronic labor shortage, which encouraged skilled labor to be done in Britain, 
where labor was not in short supply.23  Guns were  repaired in the colonies, or built from 
recycled parts of imported guns.  Yet the number of guns manufactured in the colonies grew 
significantly by the time of the Revolution as demand for the weapons grew. 
 In the interests of public order, the possession and use of firearms was, of course, subject 
to restrictions.  Various statutes and judicial orders required a certain standard of care for the use 
of firearms.  For example, a man in New Haven in 1643 was fined 20 s. for negligently shooting 
his gun “to the great danger of the lives of divers persons, who were in the chamber when the 
shott came through the window.”24  The hunting of wolves was also restricted.25 
  Gun ownership can also be seen anecdotally.  In 1759, the Governor of Virginia, Sir 
Jeffrey Amherst noted, “Most people in North America have arms of their own.”26  In 1779, the 
noted radical Whig, Dr. Richard Price commented that in America, “every inhabitant has in his 
house (as part of his furniture) a book on law and government, to enable him to understand his 
civil rights; a musket to enable him to defend these rights; and a Bible to enable him to  
																																																						
22 In one study, the author concluded that the number of gunsmiths in colonial America increased 
rapidly by the time of the Revolution, growing from four in 1700 to 112 by the Revolution.  See 
Grinsdale, “Eighteenth Century American Fowlers,” 9. 
23 Clayton E. Cramer, Firearms Ownership & Manufacturing In Early America, 
https://www.claytoncramer.com/unpublished/ArmingAmericaLong.pdf (accessed July 25, 2019) 
:185. 
24 Lee’s case (1643) cited in Richard B. Morris, “Studies in the History of American Law: With 
Special Reference to the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/Liciense (accessed February 11, 2019): 245. 
25 ibid., 245. 
26 Grinslade, “Eighteenth Century American Fowlers,” 1. 
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understand and practice his religion.”27  At the time of the revolution, one British minister 
commented: 
 “Rifles, infinitely better than those imported, are daily made in many places 
 in Pennsylvania, and all the gunsmiths everywhere constantly employed.  In 
 this country, my lord, boys, as soon as they can discharge a gun, frequently 
 exercise themselves therewith, some a fowling and others a hunting.  The great  
 quantities of game, the many kinds, and the great privileges of killing making 
 the Americans the best marksmen in the world.”28  
  
 Professor Robert Churchill, author of one of the studies, aptly concluded: “…it is clear that early 
Americans owned guns.  They owned a lot of them.”29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  
 
 
																																																						
27 Dr. Richard Price, “A Sermon Delivered to a Congregation of Protestant Dissenters” (London, 
1779, in Stephen P. Halbrook, The Founders’ Second Amendment: Origins of the Right to Bear 
Arms, (Chicago: The Independent Institute, 2008): 149. 
28 Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights, (Yale University Press, 1999) 
https://www.jstor.org/stable (accessed September 25, 2018): 140.  The minister was likely 
referring to the Pennsylvania long rifle, the first firearm manufactured entirely in the colonies.  
The rifling of the barrel made it a particularly accurate hunting and military weapon. 
29 Churchill, “Gun Ownership in Early America,” 642. 
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    Chapter 1: Firearms in Early Modern England		
	
I. Transformation from a Duty to a Right	
	 	
 When John Adams assembled the legal precedents upon which to base the soldiers’ 
claims of self-defense, they dated no earlier than the late sixteenth century because pre-modern 
England recognized no such right.  Prior legal authorities spoke only of a duty to bear arms.  
England did not maintain standing armies until the later part of the seventeenth century, and no 
professional police force until the nineteenth.  Therefore, the duty to keep and bear arms was 
necessitated by the obligation of the citizenry to serve in the militia and to serve a law 
enforcement function within society.  
 The keeping of arms was authorized for certain prescribed purposes.  Statutes and 
proclamations limited the possession and use of firearms by subjects whose income fell below a 
certain level – the vast majority of the population.  The crown desired to restrict the ownership of 
guns to the wealthy.  The primary reason for this was to protect royal and aristocratic hunting 
privileges, also to limit ownership of firearms by that portion of the population perceived to be 
more likely to revolt.  The assumption was that disloyalty was linked to poverty.30  Under 
Edward III, it was an offense to ride armed at night, or by day in fairs, markets, or in the 
presence of the king’s ministers.31   During the early sixteenth century, as gun ownership became 
more prevalent, more restrictions were imposed.  In 1511, a property qualification of £200 was 
imposed upon the ownership of crossbows, a requirement extended to firearms in 1514 by the  
																																																						
30 Lois G. Schwoerer, Gun Culture in Early Modern England, (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2016) https://eds.a.ebscohost.com (accessed May 5, 2019): 73. 
31 Statute of Northampton, 2 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1328), in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., 
The Founders’ Constitution, vol. 5, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987); 209 
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game law.32 (The qualification was reduced to £100 in 1523)  In 1553, Edward VI ordered “all 
persons who shoot guns” must register their names with the local justice of the peace.33 The most 
restrictive Games Law was enacted in 1671, limiting gun ownership to only the wealthiest 
subjects.  For the first time, persons whose wealth was derived from sources other than land, 
such as trade, were prohibited from owning guns.  Some historians have suggested that the 
measure was intended to discriminate against the urban “moneyed” interests.34  The growing 
practice of carrying arms in crowded streets made it harder to maintain the peace; as a result,  
carrying arms and handguns was prohibited in London in the early seventeenth century.35  
Throughout the period, limitations on the use of firearms were ostensibly imposed under the 
Game Acts to restrict hunting; in reality they were used to prevent popular uprisings against the 
crown by disarming the majority of the people. 
 The effectiveness of these statutes and proclamations was mixed. The enforcement of the 
various rules restricting hunting faced numerous challenges.  First, the practice of issuing gun 
licenses undermined the effectiveness of these laws.  Persons who were granted a gun license 
were exempted from the statute’s proscriptions.  The major challenge related to the widespread 
lack of compliance by the public, many of whom felt that game should not be considered the 
property of the king or the wealthy.  The response of many included grudging acceptance, willful 
disobedience, angrily expressed outrage, and written requests for change.36 The Game Law of  
																																																						
32 Schwoerer, Gun Culture in Early Modern England, 73.	
33 Joyce Lee Malcolm. To Keep And Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994): 10. 
34 Schwoerer, Gun Culture in Early Modern England, 75. 
35 Sir William Holdsworth. History of English Law (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1924) Vol. 
IV, 304. 
36 Schwoerer, Gun Culture in Early Modern England, 77. 
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1671 had authorized forests to appoint gamekeepers who could “search the houses, Outhouses, 
or other places” of persons suspected of possessing weapons.37 Yet the evidence of enforcement 
is sparse.  A review of the recorded cases indicates that the act was seldom enforced.38 
 Under ancient Anglo-Saxon codes, rules also specified when the use of physical force 
was permissible, and killing in self-defense was never justifiable.39  The basis for these rules was 
the premise that, in order to maintain the peace, one must compensate another for committing an 
act that causes physical damage.  The early history of English law contained frequent and 
detailed prohibitions against asserting one’s rights by force.40  A claim of self-defense would not 
excuse a homicide but under appropriate circumstances might entitle one to a pardon from the 
king.41 A medieval statute provided that trial judges should ask the jury if the homicide was 
accidental or in self-defense, then the justices shall inform the king, and the king shall give him 
grace, if he pleases.42 
 As the law further matured and obedience to it became more common, self-defense 
claims increased.   Having to seek pardon was gradually discarded as the law began to recognize 
certain circumstances in which a claim of self-defense could excuse the commission of a 
homicide. Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench in the early 1600’s, memorialized  
																																																						
37 Joyce Lee Malcolm. “The Creation of a “True Antient and Indubitable” Right: The English 
Bill of Rights and the Right to Be Armed,” The Journal of British Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Jul., 
1993) https://www.jstor.org/stable/176081 (accessed January 28, 2019): 239. 
38 ibid., 240. 
39 Holdsworth, History of English Law, Vol. II, 44. 
40 ibid., Vol. III, 278. 
41 The Statute of Gloucester 6 Edw 1, C. 9 (1278) provided that whatever might be urged in 
mitigation of the offense only could be urged before the King as part of an appeal for pardon; it 
could not be considered by a court of law. Appearing in Theodore F. T. Plucknett. A Concise 
History of the Common Law (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1956): 445. 
42 ibid., 445. 
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the principle that self-defense could justify a homicide in his seminal works on the English 
Common Law, The Institutes. In the Third Institute, he delineated particular circumstances in 
which a claim of self-defense would be recognized: 
 “If A. assault B. so fiercely and violently, and in such a place, and in such a manner 
 as if B. should give back, he should be in danger of his life, he may in this case 
 defend himself and if in that defense he killeth A, it is se defendo.”43  
 
 The right of self-defense thus became increasingly recognized in the English common law. 
 
II. Evolution of a natural rights theory 
  The political turmoil of the seventeenth century and the evolution of natural rights theory 
also contributed to the formulation of a right to bear arms. The dispute between crown and 
Parliament over the control of the militia became a recurring theme during the Civil War and 
following the restoration of Charles II.  Before the civil war, Parliament feared that Charles I 
might use the army raised to fight against the Irish against themselves.  At the outset of the war, 
controversy surrounded the crown’s monopoly over gunpowder, accelerating the competition 
between king and Parliament.44  During the interregnum, former royalists were repeatedly 
stripped of their weapons.45  
 With the Restoration, further restrictions on gun ownership were imposed by Charles II in 
an effort to disarm his political opponents.  In his Proclamation of November 28, 1661, Charles 
sought to disarm former soldiers of the republican army.46 This was followed by a series of 
Militia Acts in which the crown sought to exert control over the militia.  Prior to their enactment,  
																																																						
43 Sir Edward Coke. The Institutes of the Lawes of England, Third Part, 54. 
44 Malcolm. “The Creation of a “True Antient and Indubitable” Right,” 233.  
45 ibid., 234. 
46 ibid., 235. 
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Charles II used his prerogatives to create a militia whose officers were given authority to disarm 
anyone they considered dangerous.  A temporary militia act in 1661 granted Charles sole 
authority over the militia, followed by the permanent militia acts of 1662 and 1663 by which two 
deputies were required in order to disarm anyone.47  
 The transformation of the right of self-defense and the concomitant right to possess arms 
can best be understood in the context of the overarching changes in the philosophy of law and 
political theory that occurred during the seventeenth century.   Leo Strauss saw this period from 
the perspective of a transition from natural law to natural right: “The old doctrine of natural law 
forever called citizens to duties they were to fulfill, while the rhetoric of subjective rights 
proclaims rights to be vindicated and even new ones to be acquired.”48  The focus of law shifted 
from imposing duties upon society to the defense of the individual’s inalienable rights. 
 While the seeds of this change can be seen in Plato and Aristotle, the foremost English 
political theorist to espouse “natural rights” theory was Thomas Hobbes. In Leviathan, Hobbes 
rejected the scholastic notion of a natural law that enshrined certain moral goods and which was 
a participation in the divine and eternal law.  Rather, he posited man in a state of nature – a 
savage and lawless condition of war.  Men then enter into a contract among themselves to give 
up many of their rights to the sovereign in order to make peace possible.  Inasmuch as the ruler is 
not a party to the contract, there is no justification for resistance to the sovereign. Hobbes’ 
analysis changes the focus from law to “pre-social” natural rights: “whereas right is the liberty to  
 
																																																						
47 ibid., 236-237. 
48 Daniel Tanguey. Leo Strauss: An Intellectual Biography (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2007): 106. 
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do or refrain from doing, law constrains the individual and commands him to act in a certain 
way.”49   
 According to Hobbes, the fundamental pre-social right is that of self-preservation.  It is 
inalienable for one cannot transfer one’s right of self- defense: “As, first, a man cannot lay down 
the right of resisting them who assault him by force, to take away his life, because he cannot be 
understood to aim thereby at any good to himself.”50  
 The theory of natural right and the right of self- defense was further expounded upon by 
John Locke in his Two Treatises Of Government.51  First published in 1690, the treatise was 
written in part to provide a justification for the Glorious Revolution of 1688. 52 Locke rejected 
the idea of natural law as a means to structure an orderly and peaceful society, replacing it with 
individual natural rights derived from self-interest.  The fundamental rights of life, liberty and 
property make the law: the law does not create them.53  The true purpose of government is to 
preserve and develop these rights.  Both Hobbes and Locke replace natural law with natural 
right. They both contemplate a strong state that possesses extensive powers principally devoted 
to the protection of property interests.  Hobbes contemplates an absolute monarchy, as long as 
the power is exerted for a proper use.  Locke accepts that under certain circumstances,  
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individuals have a right to rebel against a tyrannical government that has not fulfilled its 
obligation to protect life, liberty and property.  Significantly, Locke did not limit this right to a 
collective right of self-preservation against a tyrant; he also posited that an individual could 
exercise this right where the exigencies of the situation are such that the law cannot protect life, 
liberty or property.54 
  The Glorious Revolution of 1688 marked the culmination of opposition to repeated 
attempts by the crown during the seventeenth century to assert its prerogatives by deploying a 
standing army and disarming political opponents. In response to these attempts, a nascent Whig 
political movement was born.  Early Whig political writers raised the alarm of a tyrannical 
monarch and praised the ideal of a “citizen soldier” to protect against the infringement of 
fundamental rights and liberties. The citizen who would protect these rights was to be armed; 
ownership of firearms became a symbol of liberty. The political theorist, James Harrington, was 
the first prominent advocate for such an armed citizenry.  In The Commonwealth Of Oceana, he 
contemplated a commonwealth comprised of a mixed form of government; “A council without a 
balance is not a commonwealth,” he argued, “but an oligarchy; and every oligarchy, except it be 
put to the defense of its wickedness or power against or power against some outward danger, is  
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factious.”55  The balance of government would be maintained by the threat of armed citizens 
serving in a militia.  For Harrington, possession of arms was necessary for political freedom.  To 
him, citizenship was predicated on the ownership of land and the possession of arms, “Domestic 
empire is founded upon dominion.  Dominion is property, real or personal, that is to say, in 
lands, or in money and goods.”56  Possession of arms became the means by which individuals 
asserted political power.   Civic virtue came to be defined as the freeholder bearing arms in 
defense of his property and of his state.57  A citizen lived on his own property, could hold public 
office, and had the right and responsibility to bear arms to protect the property and defend the 
state.  The militia was a body to be composed of all freeholders; Harrington objected to the 
practice of arming the poor and exempting the wealthy from military service.58 The possession of 
arms was not merely a civic obligation, it was necessary in order to protect one’s land and 
property. 
 Algernon Sidney was a prominent leader of the opposition during the latter part of the 
reign of Charles II. Amplifying Harrington’s ideas, he too believed that a militia of freeholders 
was essential in order to protect civil liberties and maintain a balanced government: “…in a 
popular or mixed government every man is concerned: everyone has a part, according to his 
quality or merit, all changes are prejudicial to all: whatsoever any man conceives to be for the  
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public good, he may propose it to the magistracy or to the magistrate: the body of the people is 
the public defense, and every man is armed and disciplined.”59  Sidney considered a standing 
army to be a threat to mixed government, an instrument of tyranny.  The only bulwark against 
this threat was an armed citizenry: “And no state can be said to stand upon a steady foundation, 
except those whose strength is in their own soldiery, and the body of their own people.”60  These 
early Whig theorists had set the stage for the confrontation with James II and the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. 
 
III. The English Bill of Rights 
 In the years leading up to the Boston Massacre, the political tracts of several American 
protestors repeatedly invoked the Glorious Revolution and the English Bill of Rights as sources 
of their “Rights as Englishmen.”   Much of the historical debate surrounding the English Bill of 
Rights has centered on whether “new” rights were established or merely memorialized as dating 
back to the “Ancient Constitution.”  The impetus for the Bill of Rights was the deposing of 
James II and the negotiation with William and Mary to assume the throne. James, a Catholic, 
was perceived as a threat to the Protestant majority and the birth of a Catholic heir raised alarms.  
These concerns were not without basis.  He initiated an ongoing campaign to disarm his political 
adversaries; he called for strict enforcement of all firearm restrictions and commanded militia 
officers to disarm suspicious persons.61  He then tried to use the Game Act of 1671 to generally  
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disarm his Protestant opponents, under the guise “that a great many persons not qualified by law 
under pretense of shooting matches keep muskets and other guns in their houses.”62 
 The enactment of the English Bill of Rights in 1689 represented a pivotal event in the 
assertion of gun ownership in seventeenth-century England.  In reaction to James II’s efforts to 
restrict ownership, Article VII of the Declaration and Bill of Rights states: “That the Subjects 
which are Protestants may have Armes for their defense Suitable to their Condition and as 
allowed by law.”  The exact significance of this language has become the subject of much 
debate.  Did it merely reiterate an ancient, albeit limited right, or did it conclusively transform a 
duty into an individual right to bear arms? Did it enunciate a collective right to bear arms for the 
purpose of public safety, or did it for the first time memorialize an individual right to keep and 
bear arms?   Lois G. Schwoerer and Joyce Lee Malcolm have become the leading advocates for 
each side in this debate. 
 Some insight into the questions can be found in its legislative history.  The Convention 
Parliament of 1689 was assembled to deliberate over the terms under which William of Orange 
might assume the throne.  A Declaration of Rights was drafted which in part enumerated the 
grievances against James II.  Among them, the disarming of subjects was addressed: “By causing 
several good Subjects, being Protestants, to be disarmed, at the same time when Papists were 
both armed and imployed, contrary to Law.”63  The earlier version of the proclaimed right to 
keep arms has been the source of the debate.  The first version provided: “It is necessary for the 
publick Safety, that the Subjects, which are Protestants, should provide and keep Arms for their  
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common Defense: And that the Arms which have been seized, and taken from them, be 
restored.”  A revised version provided: “That the Subjects, which are Protestants, may provide 
and keep Arms, for their common Defense.”  The final version dropped the clause “for their 
common defense” and substituted “for their defense.”64 
 There is a dearth of contemporaneous explanation for these versions.  Schwoerer argues 
that the right was severely circumscribed because the final version of Article VII specified that it 
was limited to Protestants, by one’s “condition” in life, and subject to alteration by Parliament.  
She ascribes little significance to the dropping of the phrase “common defense,” attributing its 
removal to the fact that William and his advisors objected to the implication that Protestant 
subjects, rather than he, were responsible for the “common defense” of the realm.65  This 
explanation is presented without historical citation and ignores the plain meaning of the term 
“common defense.”  Schwoerer finds a limited right to possess arms for the sole purpose of 
collective defense.   Joyce Lee Malcolm presents the more compelling argument, finding 
significance in the fact that the first reference to the “publick safety” was removed, followed by 
the removal of the “common defense” purpose, suggesting to her the blossoming of an individual 
right to bear arms.  The plain interpretation of the legislative history indicates that the drafters 
specifically did not want to limit the right to bear arms to a collective right.  The Bill of Rights 
was a watershed. After it, both an individual and collective right to bear arms became deeply 
ingrained in the cultural, legal and political philosophy of eighteenth-century England. 
IV. The Whig Contribution 
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 The early eighteenth century saw a growing political contest between Whigs, who 
advocated for a constitutional monarchy of strictly limited royal prerogatives, and Tories, who 
tended to support the traditional role of the crown beyond the control of Parliament. 
Notwithstanding the shift in power towards Parliament initiated by the Glorious Revolution, 
Whigs maintained that the balance of a mixed government was in continual jeopardy, 
particularly threatened by the presence of a standing army in peacetime. When William III 
advocated for a small peacetime standing army after the Treaty of Ryswick, the request was met 
with widespread Whig opposition.  Whig political theorists extoled the virtues of a militia and 
expounded on themes first enunciated by James Harrington and Algernon Sydney.  John 
Trenchard warned of the threat of standing armies in An Argument Shewing that a Standing 
Army is Inconsistent with a Free Government (1697) and A Short History of Standing Armies in 
England (1698).  Collaborating with Walter Moyle, he used An Argument Shewing to attack the 
proposal to increase the size of the English regular army and to praise the use of the militia 
composed of freeholders to promote a balanced government: 
 Now this Balance can never be preserved but by a Union of the natural and  
 artificial Strength of the Kingdom, that is by making the Militia to consist of 
 the same Persons as have the Property…but the Constitution must either break 
 the Army, or the Army will destroy the Constitution…the Militia to consist of the same 
 Parts as the Government, where the King was General, the Lords by virtue of their 
 Castles and Honours, the great Commanders, and the Freeholders by their Tenures, 
 The Body of the Army.66  
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 Ancient and classical precedent showed that one hallmark of a free society was the 
absence of a standing army: “as the Israelites, Athenians, Corinthians, Achaians, 
Lacedemonians, Thebans, Samnites, and Roman; none of which Nations whilst they kept their 
Liberty were ever known to maintain any Souldiers in constant Pay within their Cities, or 
suffered any of their Subjects to make War their Profession…”  The remedy for tyranny was a 
militia of freeholders – “Their arms were never lodg’d in the hands of any who had not an 
Interest in preserving the Publick Peace.” “A general Exercise of the best of their People in the 
use of Arms, was the only Bulwark of their Liberties; this was reckon’d the surest way to 
preserve them both at home and abroad…” 67 For Trenchard and Moyle, the surrender of military 
functions of the citizenry and nobility to salaried professionals was inconsistent with free 
citizenship and balanced government. 
 A common theme of Whig writers was that disarming the public posed an existential 
threat to liberty, an idea that found great popularity in 1770’s Boston.  Robert Viscount 
Molesworth, in his Account of Denmark as It Was in the Year 1692 (1694), used Denmark as a 
cautionary tale of how a free society could deteriorate into absolutism.  For forty years, the 
citizenry failed to accept their civic responsibilities and the nobility was eventually prevented by 
a standing army from returning to their estates where they could have fought to protect their 
liberties.68  Freemen who chose to hire a standing army did not remain free for very long.69  Only  
an armed population could preserve its own liberty. 
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  The most famous Whig essays were authored by John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon 
and published from 1720-1723 in a weekly periodical called The Independent Whig.  “Cato’s 
Letters” condemned corruption in government, the threat of standing armies, and the general 
moral decay of society.  Standing armies were facilitators of oppression and the militia was 
praised as the last guarantor of liberty against the oppression of a corrupt government.  In the 
September 15, 1722 letter, the authors cite James II’s use of a standing army as the principal 
cause of his demise; “It was chiefly, if not Wholly, King James’ usurped Power, and his many 
Forces, and not his being a Papist, that rendered him dreadful to his People.”70 The overarching 
theme was a pervasive distrust of power itself.  Indeed, even Tories began to argue that a 
Parliament could provide the necessary check against a tyrannical monarchy, and therefore a 
professional standing army financed by Parliament could represent a superior military force 
compared to the relatively untrained militia, a view espoused by Daniel Defoe and James 
Somers.71 To that extent, the Whig point was conceded: power itself was the problem.  Armies, 
and who controlled them, were largely metaphors. 
 In the years leading up to the American Revolution, the Whig political theorist James 
Burgh wrote the popular Political Disquisitions (1774) in which he presented his theories of 
religious and political reforms.  In it, he developed the themes of Harrington and Locke, drawing 
a close association between the possession of firearms and political power in society. “Those,  
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who have the command of the arms in a country, says Aristotle, are masters of the state, and have 
it in their power to make what revolutions they please.”72  Burgh believed that the possession of 
arms was the critical feature in a free society: 
 No kingdom can be secured otherwise than by arming the people.  The  
 possession of arms is the distinction between a freeman and a slave.  He  
 who has nothing, and who himself belongs to another, must be defended 
 by him, whose property he is, and needs no arms.  But he, who thinks he  
 is his own master, and has what he can call his own, ought to have arms  
 to defend himself, and what he possesses; else he lives precariously, and  
 at discretion.73 
 
Some historians have interpreted the writings of Whig political theorists to support only a 
collective right to bear arms.74  Yet nowhere in these tracts is this limitation explicitly stated and 
it runs contrary to their underlying themes.  Locke, Harrington, and others theorized that a well-
ordered society is predicated upon the secure ownership of property.  Where government fails or 
is unable to protect this right, the individual himself must be able to exercise it.  In order to 
achieve a vital and balanced society, it was necessary for each individual to have the ability to 
keep and bear arms to defend himself, to defend his property and to defend the state. 
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   Chapter 2: The English Common Law Tradition 
I. The English Jurists 
 Throughout the later seventeenth century and eighteenth centuries, English common law 
consistently recognized the right to keep and bear arms to be used in self-defense, a right 
predicated on the theory of justifiable homicide that had been memorialized by English jurists.  
Of these English legal authorities, the most famous was Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634).  A 
lawyer and politician, Coke served as Lord Chief Justice of England from 1613 until 1616.  His 
Institutes of the Lawes of England, published from 1628 to 1644, was a series of legal treatises 
widely regarded as the definitive and authoritative statement on the English common law. The 
Third Part of the institutes dealt with High Treason, Other Pleas of the Crown, and Criminal 
Causes – the law against murder was grounded upon the law of God.75   
 Chapter VIII of the 3rd Institutes dealt specifically with the law of homicide.  It defined 
homicide as a voluntary act with malice aforethought.  If there was no malice aforethought, the 
act might constitute manslaughter.  Coke goes on to set forth several circumstances in which a 
claim of self- defense will be recognized.76  Thus, the common law permitted the taking up of 
arms against an armed person. 
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 The treatise most frequently cited in John Adams’ legal notes of the Boston Massacre 
trials was written by William Hawkins (1681-1750), a barrister and deputy chief justice.  A 
Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, or, A System of the Principal Matters relating to That 
Subject: Digested Under Their Proper Heads, published in 1716, was the first comprehensive 
work on criminal law and served as a definitive statement on the state of the law throughout the 
eighteenth century. In it, he recognized the right of individual armed self-defense.    
 Hawkins expanded upon Coke by providing greater explanation of the circumstances in 
which arms may be used in self- defense.  “I can see no reason,” he said, “why a person, without 
provocation, is assaulted by another in any place whatsoever, in such a manner as plainly shows 
an intent to murder him, as by discharging a pistol, or pushing him with a drawn sword, may not 
justify killing such an assailant.”77  In a section that was particularly relevant to the Boston 
Massacre: 
 “If those who are engaged in a Riot…stand in their Defense, and continue the 
 Force in Opposition to the Command of a Justice of Peace, & c., or resist such 
 Justice endeavoring to arrest them, the Killing of them may be justified; and so 
 Perhaps may the killing of dangerous Rioters by any private Persons, who cannot 
 Otherwise suppress them or defend themselves from them, inasmuch as every 
 Private Person seems to be authorized by the Law to arm himself for the  
 Purposes aforesaid. (emphasis added)78  
 
 The claim of self-defense received the utmost deference in situations dealing with one’s 
home.  As the legal maxim provides: Domus sua est cuique tutissimum refugium (A man’s house  
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is his safest retreat.)79 In such circumstances, Hawkins devoted much discussion to the assertion 
of a claim of self- defense when defending the home: 
 And now I am to consider Homicide se defendo, which seems to be where one, 
 who has no other possible Means of preserving his Life from one who combats 
 with him on a sudden Quarrel, or defending his Person from one who attempt to 
 beat him, (especially if such Attempt be made upon him in his own House) kills  
 the Person by whom he is reduced to such an inevitable Necessity…80 
 
He states further: 
 Yet an Assembly of a Man’s Friends in his own House, for the Defense of the  
 Possession thereof against those who threaten to make an unlawful Entry there- 
 Into, or for the Defense of his Person against those who threaten to beat him  
 Herein, is indulged by Law; for a Man’s House is looked upon as his Castle.”81 
 “…but it hath been resolved, That no one shall incur the Penalty of the said 
 Statute for assembling his Neighbors and Friends in his own House, against  
 Those who threaten to do him any violence therein, because a Man’s House is  
 His Castle.82 
 
By the eighteenth century, the principle of the right of armed self-defense was firmly entrenched 
in English common law. 
 The Boston Massacre defense team also found support for their theory of self- defense in 
the writings of Sir Matthew Hale (1609-1676) and Sir Michael Foster (1689-1763).  Hale was a 
noted judge and barrister whose compilation of the history of English criminal law was published 
posthumously in 1736 under the title Historia Placitorum Coronae, or The History of the Pleas 
of the Crown. In it, he discussed the circumstances under which a homicide may be excused 
because of a claim of self- defense: “1. It must be an inevitable necessity, and 2. It must be in his  
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Defense – If A. upon malice prepense strike B. and then fly to the wall, and then in his own 
defense kills B. this is Murder.  But if there be Malice Between A. and B. and A. strike first, B. 
retreats to the wall, and in his own defense kills A. this is Se defendo.”83  
  Foster was a prominent English judge whose treatise, Crown Cases84 was first published 
in 1762 and was widely cited in colonial American litigation.  Sections 273 and 274, dealing 
with the law of self-defense, embodied pure natural rights theory: 
 In the case of Justifiable self- defense the injured Party may repel Force with 
 Force in Defense of his Person, Habitation, or Property, against one who  
 Manifestly intendeth and endeavoreth with Violence or Surprize to commit a  
 Known Felony upon either.  In these cases He is not obligated to retreat,  
 But may pursue his adversary ‘till he findeth himself out of Danger, and if in a  
 Conflict between them he happeneth to Kill, such Killing is Justifiable.  The  
 Right of Self- Defense in these cases is founded in the law of nature, and is  
            Not nor can be superseded by any Law of Society.85 
 
Section 274 expands the right of self- defense even to those who come to the assistance of the 
victim: 
 Where a known felony is attempted upon the Person, be it to Rob or Murder 
 here the Party assaulted may repel Force with Force, and even his servant than 
 attendant on Him, or any Other Person present may interpose for preventing  
 Mischief; and if Death ensueth, the Party so interposing will be Justified.  In  
 This case, Nature and Social duty cooperate.86  
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By the eighteenth century, legal treatises had acknowledged the right of self- defense as 
fundamental, one based on the law of nature. 
 
II. Common Law Development 
 Statutory and case law precedent of the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
explicitly acknowledge the right to keep firearms for self-defense and other non-military 
purposes. In personal correspondence, Charles II recognized that arms might be needed by an 
individual for self-defense.87  After the fall of James II, Parliament passed a bill to disarm all 
Catholics in March 1689.88  Significantly, the bill left the individual Catholic “such necessary 
Weapons as shall be allowed to him by Order of the Justices of the Peace… for the Defense of 
his House or Person.”89  Despite her minimization of an individual right to bear arms, Lois 
Schwoerer admits that “members of the Convention were sensitive to the natural and common 
law right of self- defense and did not deny it.”90  The courts also objected to efforts by the crown 
to disarm political enemies.  In April 1686, the sheriff of Bristol, Sir John Knight actively sought 
to enforce laws against Catholic worship.  James II tried to silence him by charging him with  
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unlawful use of a firearm.  It was alleged that he walked the streets with guns and that he entered 
a church with a gun to terrorize the king’s subjects.  A jury acquitted him of the charges.91 
 During the eighteenth century, courts repeatedly held that individuals could keep guns in 
their homes to be used for self- defense and to ward off predators.  Firearms could only be seized 
if it were proven that they were being used for proscribed hunting purposes.  Several of these 
cases arose under the Game Act of 1706, which provided that no “person, not qualified, shall 
keep or use any greyhounds, setting-dogs, hays, lurchers, tunnels, or any other engine to kill or 
destroy games.”92   The act excluded “guns” from the list of proscribed weapons, because a gun 
was “frequently necessary to be kept and used for other purposes, as the killing of noxious 
vermin and the like.”93  Several court cases affirmed this interpretation.  In the decision Rex v. 
Gardner,94 the defendant was convicted by a justice of the peace for having unlawfully kept a 
gun.  Finding for the defendant and against the broad interpretation of the statute that the mere 
keeping of a gun was a crime, the court concluded that the statute should be applied only to those 
weapons that by their nature are almost solely applicable to the destruction of game: 
 …but a gun is a very useful and necessary thing in a house, both for defense, 
 and to prevent birds and other rapacious animals from destroying corn or other 
 such things; for this purpose any man may lawfully keep a gun in his house, and 
 though it may be applied to an unlawful purpose, yet it by no means follows, that 
 it is kept for such an end, unless that be manifested by some act done, which shews  
 it is kept to destroy the game.95 
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In Wingfield v. Stratford and Osman, the court concluded that the keeping of a gun, per se, is not 
a keeping of a weapon for killing or destroying game: 
 
 It is not to be imagined, that it was the intention of the Legislature, in making 
 the 5 Ann. C. 14, to disarm all the people of England… But as Guns are not  
 expressly mentioned in that Statute, and as a Gun may be kept for the Defense  
 of a Man’s House, and for divers other lawful purposes, it was necessary to alledge 
 in order to its being comprehended within the Meaning of the Words “any other  
 Engines to kill the Game,” that the Gun had been used for killing the Game.96 
 
Thus, even where the English Bill of Rights qualified the right of Protestants to bear arms with 
the clause “as allowed by law,” the courts concluded that individuals had an overriding right to 
keep arms for self- defense and other purposes.  This view was re-affirmed as late as 1780, when 
the recorder of London responded to an inquiry regarding the right of individuals to keep 
firearms.  He stated in response: 
 The right of his majesty’s Protestant subjects to have arms for their own 
 defense, and to use them for lawful purposes, is most clear and undeniable. 
 It seems, indeed, to be considered, by the ancient laws of this kingdom, not 
 only as a right, but as a duty; for all the subjects of the realm, who are able 
 to bear arms, are bound to be ready, at all times, to assist the sheriff, and 
 other civil magistrates, in the execution of the laws and the preservation of 
 the public peace.  And that right, which every Protestant most unquestion- 
 ably possesses, individually, may, in many cases, must, be exercised collect- 
 ively, is likewise a point which I conceive to be most clearly established by 
 the authority of judicial decisions and ancient acts of Parliament, as well as 
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 by reason and common sense. (emphasis added) 97 
 
III. Sir William Blackstone 
 
 The most celebrated English jurist of the eighteenth century was Sir William Blackstone 
(1723-1780), whose Commentaries on the Laws of England, An Analysis of the Laws of England, 
published in 1766, was recognized as the definitive summary of English common law.  Noted for 
its accessibility and readability, it became the standard text in both England and Colonial 
America.98  
 The first volume of the Commentaries deals with the Rights of Persons.  The rights of 
Englishmen, Blackstone says, stem from “the natural right of resistance and self- preservation, 
when the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence of 
oppression.” 99 At the outset, he sets forth what he considers to be the absolute rights possessed 
by each individual: 
 The rights of persons considered in their natural capacities are also of two sorts, 
 absolute, and relative.  Absolute, which are such as appertain and belong to  
 particular man, merely as individuals or single persons: relative, which are incident  
 to them as members of society, and standing in various relations to each other.100 
 
The absolute rights are: 
 
 1. The right of personal security consists in a person’s legal and uninterrupted 
   enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. 
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   2. Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves       
   liberty of individuals. 
   3. The third absolute right inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: 
   which consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, 
   without any control or diminution, save only by the law of the land.101  
 
Blackstone observed that these absolute rights would have been illusory, “if the constitution had 
provided no other method to secure their enjoyment.”102 Therefore,  
 It has, therefore, established certain other auxiliary subordinate rights of the subject, 
 which serve principally as outworks or barriers, to protect and maintain inviolate the 
 three great and primary rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private 
 property.103  
 
Blackstone goes on to enumerate five auxiliary rights, the fifth being the right of subjects to have 
arms for their defense: 
 The fifth and last auxiliary right of the subject, that I shall present mention,  
 is that of having arms for their defense suitable to their condition and degree, 
 and as such are allowed by law… and it is indeed, a public allowance under 
 due restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when  
 the sanctions of society and laws are found insufficient to restrain the violence 
 of oppression.104 
 
 As the English origins of the right to keep and bear arms has received more recent 
attention in the context of the Second Amendment debate, defenders of a collective right have 
focused on this language to support their argument.  Steven Heyman concludes that the right is 
not an “absolute right of individuals” nor an “inalienable right to arms for private defense.”105 In 
support of this claim, he argues that the right is constrained by the exigencies of immediate  
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violence.  Suggesting that the right is a collective one held by the community to defend against 
tyranny, he finds support in Blackstone:  
 For civil liberty, rightly understood, consists in protecting the rights of individuals 
 by the united force of society: society cannot be maintained, and of course can 
 exert no protection, without obedience to some sovereign power: and obedience is 
 an empty name, if every individual has a right to decide how far he himself shall  
 obey.106 
 
 Saul Cornell, in A Well Regulated Militia, also viewed Blackstone as supporting a collective 
right to keep and bear arms, focusing on the term “public allowance” and the imposition of due 
“restrictions” in support of the claim.  He concludes that “This ancient right was not exercised by 
individuals acting unilaterally or in isolation, but rather required that citizens act together in 
concert as part of a well-regulated militia.”107 He believes that the right of self-defense was so 
limited by common law restrictions as to render it unimportant.   
 These arguments do not withstand scrutiny.  The notion that Blackstone contemplated 
only a “public” right to bear arms conflates “resistance” and “self-preservation” into one 
collective purpose, thereby rendering “self-preservation” meaningless.  Heyman’s claim that 
“self-preservation” is synonymous with “public defense” is made without support.   To suggest 
that arms may only be used collectively to protect “personal security,” “personal liberty,” and 
“private property” is implausible. Locke insists there are times when society cannot act to 
preserve personal security and property.  Are we to believe that an individual does not have a 
right to use firearms in such instances?  In fact, rather than categorizing auxiliary rights as of 
lesser importance, Blackstone deems them crucial: 
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 And lastly, to vindicate these rights, when actually violated or attacked, the 
 subjects of England are entitled, in the first place, to the regular administration  
 and free course of justice in the courts of law, next, to the right of petitioning 
 the king and parliament for redress of grievances; and lastly, to the right of  
 having and using arms for self-preservation and defense. (emphasis added) 108 
    
 The suggestion that the right of self-defense is confined to a small corner of minor rights 
is also belied by Blackstone’s treatment of this topic in the Commentaries.  It is the specific 
authority cited by John Adams and Josiah Quincey in their “Boston Massacre” arguments.  
Blackstone devotes a chapter to the right of self-defense in his 4th Book dealing with criminal 
law.  He begins by defining a “justifiable homicide” as: 
 In the next place, such homicide as is committed for the preservation of any 
 forcible or atrocious crime, is justifiable by the law of nature; and also by the  
 law of England, as it stood so early as the time of Bracton, and as it since declared 
 by statute 24 Hen. VIII, c.5.  If any person attempts a robbery or murder of  
 another, or attempts to break open a house in the night time, (which extends also 
 to an attempt to burn it) and shall be killed in such attempt, the slayer shall be  
 acquitted and discharged.109 
 
Blackstone contemplates a fundamental, but limited right of self-defense, but one that is not 
unlimited: 
 For the one uniform principle that runs through our own, and all other laws, 
 seems to be this; that where a crime, in itself capital, is endeavored to be  
 committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force by the death of the party 
 attempting.  But we must not carry this doctrine to the visionary length that 
 Mr. Locke does: “that all manner of force without right upon a man’s person, 
 puts him in a state of war with the aggressor; and, of consequence that, being  
 in such a state of war, he may lawfully kill him that puts him under this un- 
 natural constraint.110 
 
Blackstone differentiates an “excusable homicide” from a “justifiable homicide;” 
 “Homicide in self-defense, or se defendendo, upon a sudden affray, is also  
 excusable rather than justifiable, by the English law.  This species of self- 
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 defense must be distinguished from that just now mentioned, as calculated 
 to hinder the perpetration of a capital crime; which is not only a matter of 
 excuse, but of justification; but the self-defense, which we are now speaking  
 of, is that whereby a man may protect himself from an assault, or the like, in  
 the course of a sudden brawl or quarrel, by killing him who assaults him.”111 
 
 Blackstone’s summary of the law of self-defense represented the culmination of almost 
150 years of legal theory and analysis.  Some have suggested that the absence of an explicit 
reference to the use of firearms to be used in self-defense was meaningful.  Heyman notes that 
Blackstone does not discuss how arms are to be held, whether they are to be held by the 
individual or by the public associated with the militia.  He dismisses this as a mere practical 
question.112 Yet if it is considered that the bearing of firearms was only to be the right of the 
community, the ability of the individual to use them in self- defense would be rendered 
meaningless.  Such a conclusion is rebutted by English case law and the clear meaning of 
Blackstone’s words.  
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  Chapter 3: Impact on Colonial Political and Legal Thought 
I. Influence of the English Writers 
 As the record of the Boston Massacre trial demonstrates, it is difficult to overstate the  
influence that English Enlightenment, legal and radical Whig writers had upon American legal 
and political thought during the eighteenth century.  “Despite the efforts that have been made to 
discount the influence of the “glittering generalities” of the European Enlightenment on  
eighteenth-century Americans, their influence remains, and is profusely illustrated in the political 
literature.”113  The extent to which the American political leaders read and cited their English 
antecedents is impressive, as the references in political tracts, pamphlets and personal 
correspondence is pervasive. “In pamphlet after pamphlet the American writers cited Locke on 
natural rights and on the social and governmental contract, Montesquieu and later Delolme on 
the character of British liberty and on the institutional requirements for its attainment, Voltaire 
on the evils of clerical oppression, Beccaria on the reform of criminal law.”114  
  Donald Lutz has compiled a study of the influence of European writers on late 
eighteenth-century American political thought,115 reviewing the political writings of Americans 
between 1760 and 1805 to determine which authors were most popular.  Included in the review 
were an estimated 15,000 items, including books, pamphlets, newspaper articles, and 
monographs.  After Montesquieu, the most prominent Enlightenment theorist cited was John  
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Locke, especially during the revolutionary period.  The Founding Fathers recognized that the 
philosophical basis for the break with England was the application of English precedent to the 
American situation.   “I did not consider it as any part of my charge,” Jefferson wrote to 
Madison,  “to invent new ideas altogether…”116 “No Government was ever made so perfectly 
upon the Principle of the Peoples Right and Equality.” John Adams wrote.  “It is Locke, Sydney 
and Rousseau and Mably reduced to Practice in the first Instance.”117 
 The Italian legal philosopher Cesare Beccaria was often cited by Jefferson, Blackstone, 
and John Adams on the topic of criminal law reform.118  His book, On Crimes and Punishment, 
published in 1764, provided the first organized theory of criminal justice.  Beccaria’s views had 
particular relevancy to the topic of the right to bear arms: 
 The laws that forbid the carrying of arms are laws of such a nature.  They  
 disarm only those who are neither inclined nor determined to commit 
 crimes… Such laws make things worse for the assaulted and better for the 
 assailant; they serve rather to encourage than to prevent homicides, for an 
 unarmed man may be attacked with greater confidence than an armed man.119 
 
Beccaria strongly disapproved of European laws of that time that prohibited the bearing of arms.  
Throughout his adult life, Thomas Jefferson maintained a Commonplace Book which contained 
many of his thoughts on government.  In it, there are no fewer than twenty-six extracts from 
Beccaria in Italian, including his comments on carrying arms.120  
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  Whig political writers enjoyed considerable popularity in the colonies, and were widely 
cited during the 1770’s. The most important of these writers were John Trenchard and Thomas 
Gordon, some even suggesting that their writings were of equal importance to John Locke.121  As 
the historian Clinton Rossiter put it, “… Cato’s Letters rather than Locke’s Civil Government 
was the most popular, quotable, esteemed source of political ideas in the colonial period.”122   
  Trenchard and Gordon had great influence on the founding fathers.  John Adams made 
frequent references in his correspondence.  “Cato’s letters and the Independent Whig, and all the 
Writings of Trenchard and Gordon, Mrs. Maccahy’s history, Burgh’s political disquisitions, 
Clarendons history, of the civil war, & all of the writings relative to the revolutions in England, 
became fashionable reading.”123  Jefferson was known to admire Cato’s Letters and The 
Independent Whig whose writings he had in his library.  Copies were frequently found in public 
libraries.  For those without books or access to libraries, newspapers and pamphlets provided a 
ready introduction to their ideas.124  Printed versions of the works of Trenchard were used 
frequently in the protests against the quartering of British troops in the 1760’s.125 
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 Algernon Sydney also stands out.  His Discourses on Government was frequently cited in 
newspapers and pamphlets; Jefferson considered him a leading source for the American 
understanding of the principles of political liberty and the rights of humanity.  When enunciating 
the principles of government to be included in University of Virginia law school curriculum, he 
wished that: “as to the general principles of liberty and the rights of man, in nature, and in 
society, the doctrines of Locke in his “Essay concerning the true original, extent, & end of civil 
gov’t, and of Sydney in his “Discourses on govmt’”, may be considered as those generally 
approved by our fellow citizens.”126  According to Caroline Robbins, “During the American 
Revolution Sydney’s Discourses was more of a Bible to the revolutionaries than any of the other 
works of this century, Milton only excepted.”127  John Adams was effusive in his praise of 
Sydney in his correspondences with Thomas Jefferson.128 
 James Burgh’s Political Disquisitions (1774) has been described as “perhaps the most 
important political treatise which appeared in England in the first half of the reign of George 
III.”129  Its themes of an armed citizenry willing to defend themselves resonated with colonial  
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Americans and made it, says Bernard Bailyn, “the key book” of the founding generation. 130   
Jefferson included it in a course of recommended reading for James Madison and James Monroe. 
 The influence of James Burgh and others was not merely derived passively by reading: 
there was an active dialogue between colonial American political leaders and their British 
counterparts during the revolutionary period.  In fact, Political Disquisitions may have been the 
product of political meetings that took place between American and English political theorists. 
James Burgh, Richard Price and Benjamin Franklin belonged to the club of Honest Whigs, a 
radical Whig political discussion group, which met in London taverns during the 1760’s and 
early 1770’s.  Burgh may have even ghost-written Franklin’s political tracts, under the 
pseudonym, “The Colonist’s Advocate.”131  
 The popularity of Whig political theorists in colonial America was rivaled by interest in 
the writings of common law jurists.  Prominent among them was Sir Edward Coke, often cited in 
revolutionary pamphlets to support challenges to the authority of Parliament to legislate for the 
colonies.132  Later arguments were based upon the supremacy of natural law.  Bailyn states: “Sir 
Edward Coke is everywhere in the literature – the citations are almost as frequent as, and 
occasionally even less precise than, those to Locke, Montesquieu, and Voltaire.”133  For 
Jefferson, “Coke Lyttleton was the universal law book of students, and a sounder Whig never  
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wrote, nor of profounder learning in the orthodox doctrines of the British Constitution, or what 
was called British liberties.”134   Coke’s Institutes, he said, was “executed with so much learning  
and judgment, that I do not recollect that a single position in it has ever been judicially 
denied.”135  John Adams considered Coke as “our judicial oracle.”136 
 The greatest common law theorist, and one who had the most profound impact upon 
colonial Americans, was Sir William Blackstone.  In his Commentaries, Blackstone presented a 
readable and comprehensive account of English common law, its “large mass of legal detail” 
making it “particularly useful in eighteenth-century America.”137  The Commentaries were the 
principal means by which colonists learned of the state of English law.  It was the standard legal 
authority of the day.   
 Blackstone’s Commentaries were immensely popular in the colonies because it had 
particular appeal to the layman; justices of the peace and other local officials frequently referred 
to it in order to become conversant in the common law.  It allowed ordinary people to acquaint 
themselves with criminal law.  The Commentaries received most acclaim in thinly settled 
colonial America.138 
 While popular with the general public, Blackstone’s greater influence was on opinion 
forums.  In the drafting of the Declaration of Independence, the recitation of the grievances  
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against George III “in the main are sustained by Blackstone’s description of the rights of 
Englishmen and the principles of the British Constitution.”139  Jefferson’s theory of natural rights 
echoed the theories of Blackstone in the Commentaries: “This law of nature being coeval with  
mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior to any other… no human laws are of 
any validity, if contrary to this..”140  He frequently cited Blackstone in his legal writings and  
recommended the Commentaries to his students.  In his law lectures, James Wilson also drew 
heavily on Blackstone.141 
 Bailyn has suggested that “the citations are plentiful, but the knowledge they reflect, like 
that of the ancient classics, is at times superficial.”142  But the references to Blackstone by the 
founding fathers belie this contention.  The correspondence of John Adams reveals an avid 
reader of Blackstone, one intimately familiar with him.  His diaries are filled with references.143  
A letter to Mercy Otis Warren, of July 11, 1807 is typical:  
 My opinion of the British Constitution was formed long before I had any  
 Thing to do in Public Life, more than twenty years before I ever saw the 
 British Island.  I learned from Fortescue Smith Montesquieu Vattel, Ackerly, 
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 Bacon Bolinbrooke Sullivan and Blackstone and Delolme and even from  
 Marchamont Nedham Algernon Sydney, James Harrington and every other  
 Writer on Government and from al the Examples I had ever read in History.144 
 
                     
  In 1782, a list was prepared of the books that should be imported for use by the 
Continental Congress. Included were Coke’s Institutes, Blackstone’s Commentaries, Burgh’s 
Political Disquisitions, Price’s Political works, Hobbes’ Works, Harrington’s works, Sidney on 
Government, Locke on Government, Parliamentary History, and Parliamentary debates.145  This 
was not window dressing. 
 What lessons did the Founding Fathers learn from these authors?  For a century, Whig 
political theorists had warned of the dangers of power in the hands of those hostile to individual 
liberty. The embodiment of this threat was the standing army.  It was the right of each individual 
to arm himself for protection. The events leading to the American Revolution provided the 
opportunity to test those theories in practice. 
 During the course of the 1760’s, American colonists increasingly asserted their rights as 
Englishmen, the first of them the right of self-preservation.  In 1764, James Otis published The 
rights of the British colonies asserted and proved. In it, he quoted verbatim from the English Bill 
of Rights: “That the subjects which are protestants, may have arms for their defense, suitable to 
their conditions, and as allowed by law.”146  He then quoted John Locke: 
 For no man or society of men having a power to deliver up their preservation 
 or consequently the means of it to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion 
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 of another, whenever anyone shall go about to bring them into such a slavish 
 condition, they will always have a right to preserve what they have not a power 
 to part with, and to rid themselves of those who invade this fundamental, sacred, 
 and unalterable law of self-preservation for which they entered into society.147 
 
                     
The Stamp Act of 1765 imposed on the colonies a direct tax on printed materials, including 
newspapers and legal and other commercial documents.  It was met with widespread opposition 
and was repealed in 1766.  Following its repeal, the Townshend Acts imposed new taxes in 1767 
and 1768 on various products including paper and tea.  In 1768, the Massachusetts House of 
Representatives circulated a letter among the colonies, condemning unjust taxation.148 Tensions 
between the colonists and the Crown and Parliament escalated to the point where a contingent of 
British troops was sent to Boston to maintain the peace, evoking fears of a standing army and the 
threat to the rights of Englishmen, among them the right to bear arms.   
  The “Journal of the Times” was a daily record of politically significant events for the 
entire British Empire prepared by men in the particular town in which they were living.  The 
serial Boston column, believed to have been written by John Adams, Samuel Adams, and Josiah 
Quincey, was also published in the New York Journal.149 In an anonymous piece from April 27, 
1769, the author invoked the right to bear arms: 
 It is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed 
 by the Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defense; and as Mr. Blackstone  
 observes, it is to be made use of when the sanctions of society and law are 
 found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression.150   
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A February 6, 1769 column in The Boston Evening Post was emphatic: 
 For it is certainly beyond human art and sophistry, to prove the British 
 subjects, to whom the privilege of possessing arms is explicitly recognized 
 by the Bill of Rights, and who live in a province where the law requires them  
 to be equip’d with arms…151  
 
               
Samuel Adams wrote an editorial in the Boston Gazette on February 27, 1769 defending a 
resolution passed by the town of Boston to keep arms for its own defense.  He repeatedly 
invoked Blackstone: 
 “At the revolution, the British Constitution was again restor’d to its 
 original principles, declared in the bill of rights; which was afterwards  
 pass’d into a law, and stands as a bulwark to the natural rights of subjects. 
 “To vindicate these rights, says Mr. Blackstone, when actually violated  
 or attack’d, the subjects of England are entitled first to the regular adminis- 
 tration and free course of justice in the courts of law – next to the right 
 of petitioning the King and parliament for redress of grievances – and 
 lastly, to the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence.” 
 These he calls “auxiliary subordinate rights, which serve principally as 
 Barriers to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights 
 of personal security, personal liberty and private property”; And that of  
 having arms for their defence he tells us is “a public allowance, under due 
 restrictions, of the natural right of resistance and self-preservation, when 
 the sanctions of society ad laws are found insufficient to restrain the 
 violence of oppression.”152 
 
 Another edition of the “Journal of the Times” (April 13, 1769) again defended the private right 
to bear arms: 
 “Instances of the licentious and outrageous behavior of the military 
 conservators of the peace still multiply upon us, some of which are 
 of such a nature, and have been carried to so great lengths, as must 
 serve fully to evince that a late vote of this town, calling upon the 
 inhabitants to provide themselves with arms for their defence, was 
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 a measure as prudent as it was legal.”153 
 
Boston had become the epicenter of protest against British rule.  
 
II. The Boston Massacre Trials  
 A precursor to the events of the Boston Massacre can be seen a year earlier.  On April 19, 
1769, a British impressment gang boarded a Marblehead fishing vessel off the coast of 
Massachusetts.  In response to the attack, seaman Michael Corbett drew a line in salt, 
proclaiming, “If you step over the line, I shall consider it as proof that you are determined to 
impress me, and by the Eternal God of Heaven, you are a dead man!”154 The British officer fired 
a pistol; in response, the leader of the sailors, Michael Corbett, harpooned the officer, killing 
him.  The trial of Corbett portended arguments that would be made in the Boston Massacre trial: 
he had a natural right of self– defense and could kill the officer in response to a threat to his and 
others personal safety. 
 Corbett and three other sailors were defended by John Adams and James Otis.  Drawing 
on English common law authority, Adams argued that the attempted impressment was illegal 
and, therefore, the killing of the British officer constituted justifiable homicide – Homicide se 
defendo.  Adams cited Sir William Hawkins’ principle that:  
 The killing of dangerous Rioters, by any private Persons, who cannot otherwise suppress 
 them, or defend themselves from them, inasmuch as every private Person seems to be 
 authorized by the Law to arm himself for the Purposes aforesaid… I can see no Reason 
 why a Person, who without provocation is assaulted by another in any Place whatever, in   
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 such manner as plainly shews and Intent to murder him, as by discharging a Pistall or 
 pushing at him with a drawn sword, may not justify killing such Assailant.155   
 
 “In these Circumstances what was his Duty?,” Adams asked the judges. “He had an undoubted 
Right, not merely to make a push at Lt. Panton, but to have darted an Harpoon, a dagger thro the  
Heart of every Man in the whole Gang.”156 The court found sufficient grounds for justifiable 
homicide because the defendants had the right to defend themselves where the impressment was 
illegal.  Although this case did not entail the use of firearms, that issue would be dealt with by 
the courts in the coming months.157 
 The pleas in the Boston Massacre trial brought together the right of self-preservation, the 
rights of an armed citizen, and one hundred years of English common law and political precedent 
in one courtroom.  British troops had been quartered in Boston since 1768, culminating in the 
events of March 5.  Following the shooting, a Grand Jury indicted British Captain Thomas 
Preston and eight soldiers for murder.  Preston had unsuccessfully sought the assistance of 
defense counsel; after repeated rejections, John Adams and Josiah Quincy agreed to defend him 
and the soldiers.  The prosecution was led by Samuel Quincy and assisted by Robert Treat Paine.  
A decision was made to sever the trial of the officer from that of the soldiers because of the  
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concern that a joint trial would result in mutual “finger-pointing” resulting in a verdict of guilty.  
Therefore, Preston was tried separately from the soldiers, William Wemms, James Hartigan, 
William McCauley, Hugh White, Matthew Kilroy, William Warren, John Carrol and Hugh  
Montgomery.158  At the urging of General Thomas Gage, Commander of British troops in 
America, the trials were deferred until the fall of 1770 to allow time for emotions to cool. 
 The trial of Preston began on October 24, 1770 and lasted 6 days.  It centered on the 
question of whether he had ordered the soldiers to shoot.  The prosecution failed to prove its case 
as a result of conflicting witness testimony, and he was acquitted.  The trial of the soldiers, Rex v. 
Wemms, began on November 27, 1770 and would become the most celebrated criminal trial of 
the period.  One hundred years of English common law and natural rights theory were 
summoned in support of the right of self-defense.  
 Both the prosecution and the defense agreed that the colonists had the right to arm 
themselves in self- defense. Samuel Quincy noted that when the soldiers came out “with clubs, 
cutlasses, and other weapons of death; this occasioned a general alarm; every man therefore had 
a right, and very prudent it was to endeavor to defend himself if attacked…”159  Robert Treat 
Paine, co-prosecutor amplified the point: “The Inhabitants had for a Long while been fully 
sensible of the ill disposition and Abusive Behavior of many of the Soldiers towards them and 
the most peaceable among us had found it necessary to arm themselves with heavy Walking 
Sticks or Weapons of Defence when they went abroad.”160  He contended that the behavior of the  
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crowd was justified, as they were actions of “a free People Oppressed and galled with the 
ravaging of an ungoverned Soldiery.”161  Adams also acknowledged the right of Bostonians to  
arm themselves: “Here every private person is authorized to arm himself, and on the strength of 
this authority, I do not deny the inhabitants had a right to arm themselves at that time, for their 
defence, not for offence, that distinction is material and must be attended to.”162 
 The crux of the defense was that the soldiers right of self-preservation justified the 
killing.  We may glean the arguments from the copious notes of the trial kept by John Adams, 
who summarized the common law and natural law foundation of the right of self-defense:   
  self-love, which is not only our indisputable right, but our clearest duty, 
 by the laws of nature, this is interwoven in the heart of every individual… 
 It is the first, and strongest principle in our nature, Justice Blackstone calls 
 it “The primary canon in the law of nature.” A man is authorized therefore 
 by common sense, and the laws of England, as well as those of nature, to 
 love himself better than his fellow subject… The rules of the common law  
 therefore, which authorize a man to preserve his own life at the expense of 
 another’s, are not contradicted by any divine or moral law.163 
 
He then presented the jury with the legal basis for the claim of self- defense, citing English 
jurists for support: 
 I shall now, read to you a few authorities on this subject of self-defence. 
 Foster 273 in the case of justifiable defence, “The injured party may repell 
 with force in defence of his person, habitation, or property, against one who 
 manifestly intendeth and endeavoureth with violence, or surprise, to commit 
 a known felony upon either.”  In these cases he is not obligated to retreat, 
 but may pursue his adversary, till he findeth himself out of danger, and in a  
 conflict between them he happeneth to kill, such killing is justifiable.164 
 
Citing Sir William Hawkins, he stated: 
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 Yet it seems that a private person, a fortiori, an officer of justice, who  
 happens unavoidably to kill another in endeavoring to defend himself from, 
 or suppress dangerous rioters, may justify the fact, in as much as he only  
 does his duty in aid of the public justice.  And I can see no reason why a  
 person, who without provocation is assaulted by another in any place what- 
 soever, in such manner as plainly shews an intent to murder him, as by dis- 
 charging a pistol, or pushing at him with a drawn sword, &c. may not justify 
 killing such an assailant, as much as if he attempted to rob him.165 
 
Later, again citing Hawkins, he argued: “And so perhaps the killing of dangerous rioter, may be 
justified by any private persons, who cannot otherwise suppress them, or defend themselves from 
them; in as much as every private person seems to be authorized by the law, to arm himself for 
the purpose aforesaid.”166  In his peroration, he proclaimed the supremacy of the law, quoting 
Algernon Sydney: 
 To use the words of a great and worthy man, a patriot, and an hero, and  
 enlightened friend of mankind, and a martyr to liberty: I mean ALGERNON 
 SYDNEY, who from his earliest infancy sought a tranquil retirement under 
 The shadow of the tree of liberty, with his tongue, his pen, and his sword,  
 “The law, (says he,) no passion can disturb. ‘Tis void of desire and fear, lust 
 and anger.167 
 
 On the day before, his co-counsel, Josiah Quincy, had addressed the jury regarding the 
natural right of self- defense, using arguments that recalled John Locke; “The law indulges no 
man in being his own avenger. Early, in the history of jurisprudence, we find the sword taken 
from the party injured, and put into the hands of the magistrate.”168  
 Let it not be apprehended, that I am advancing a doctrine, that a soldier may 
 attack an inhabitant, and he not allowed to defend himself.  No Gentlemen! 
 If a soldier rush violently through the street and presents a weapon of death,  
 in a striking posture; no doubt the person assailed may defend himself, even  
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 to taking the life of the assailant….it is, I say, upon the right of self- defence 
 and self-preservation we rely for our acquittal.169 
 
At the conclusion, he again quoted Locke: 
  
 I beg leave to read to you a passage from a very great, theoretic, writer: a 
 man whose praises have resounded through all the known world, and 
 probably will, through all ages… I mean the sagacious Mr. Locke; He Will tell you, 
 Gentlemen, in his Essay on Government “That all manner of force without right 
  puts man in a state of war with the aggressor; and of consequence, that, being in  
  such a state of war, he may LAWFULLY KILL him, who put him under 
  this unnatural restraint.170 
  
 In its charge to the jury, the crown acknowledged that the law supports a natural right of 
self-defense, even for soldiers, “A man by becoming a soldier, doth not thereby lose the right of 
self-defence which is founded in the law of nature.  Where anyone is, without his own default, 
reduced to such circumstances, as the laws of society cannot avail him, the law considers him, 
“as still in that instance under the protection of the law of nature.” 171 The charge also reaffirmed 
the right of private citizens to carry arms: “It is the duty of all persons (except women, decrepit 
persons, and infants under fifteen) to aid and assist the peace officers to suppress riots & c. when 
called upon to do it.  They may take with them such weapons as are necessary to enable them 
effectually to do it.”172  The jury acquitted six of the soldiers and found two guilty of 
manslaughter.  It was a vindication of one hundred years of English common law and natural law 
theory, firmly establishing an individual right of self-defense through the use of firearms. 
 In the aftermath of the Boston Massacre, a committee headed by James Bowdoin 
protested the episode as proof of the dangers of a standing army. Their narrative of the events  
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was widely disseminated throughout the colonies.  In November 1772, Boston adopted a 
proclamation asserting the right of self-defense in opposition to tyranny.  In words taken from 
Locke and Blackstone, the Rights of Colonists stressed the natural right of self-preservation;  
“Among the Natural Rights of the Colonists are these First, a right to Life, Secondly to Liberty; 
thirdly to Property; together with the Right to support and defend them in the best manner they 
can – Those are evident Branches of, rather than deductions from the Duty of Self Preservation, 
commonly called the first Law of Nature.”173 
    
 The years leading up to the revolution were marked by the quartering of British troops in 
Boston and repeated efforts by the authorities to disarm the colonists. Thus, Boston presented the 
very threat of a standing army and tyrannical government that Whig political theorists had 
warned for a century.  Josiah Quincy’s, Observations On The Act Of Parliament, borrows freely 
from the theories of James Harrington and John Trenchard: 
 No free government was ever founded, or ever preserved its liberty, without 
 uniting the characters of citizen and soldier in those destined for the defence  
 of the state.  The sword should never be in the hands of any but those who have 
 an interest in the safety of the community, who fight for their religion and their 
 offspring,- and repel invaders that they may return to their private affairs and 
 the enjoyment of freedom and good order.  Such are a well-regulated militia  
 composed of the freeholders, citizens, and husbandmen, who take up arms to  
 preserve their property as individuals, and their rights as freemen.174  
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Colonists armed themselves and organized militias in order to preserve their property and their 
liberties, as individuals. 
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                 Chapter 4: The Development of a Constitutional Right 
I.  State Constitution Antecedents  
 At the outbreak of the Revolution, some of the newly drafted constitutions, directly 
patterned after the English Bill of Rights, contained guarantees of the right to bear arms. Virginia 
adopted a Declaration of Rights on June 12, 1776 which contained a guarantee of the right to 
bear arms in its Article VII: “That a well- regulated Militia, composed of the Body of the People, 
trained to Arms, is the proper, natural, and safe Defence of a free State; that standing Armies, in 
Time of Peace should be avoided, as dangerous to liberty,”175  Jefferson then authored a draft 
constitution for Virginia which, among other rights and liberties, guaranteed that: “No freeman 
shall be debarred the use of arms [within his own lands or tenements]”176  As the Declaration of 
Rights was already enacted, Jefferson’s proposal was not used.  Pennsylvania’s constitution, 
enacted in September 1776, also guaranteed the right to bear arms, explicitly providing for both 
an individual and collective right: “That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of 
themselves”177  Delaware and Maryland did not deal with the right to bear arms.178  New Jersey 
did not contain a specific bill of rights, as it was thought that the common law protected them.  
The New York constitution, passed in 1777, did not specifically provide for a right to bear  
 
 
 
																																																						
175 Halbrook, The Founders’ Second Amendment, 129. 
176 ibid., 131. 
177 “A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants of the State of Pennsylvania,” Accessible 
Archives, http://www.accessible.com.ezproxy.shu.edu (accessed January 28, 2019). 
178 Halbrook, The Founders’ Second Amendment, 142-144. 
	 	
                  57 
arms.179  In Massachusetts, the constitution included a Declaration of Rights which provided 
that: 
 The people have a right to keep and bear arms for the common defence.  And 
 as, in time of peace armies are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be main- 
 tained without the consent of the legislature; and the military power shall always 
 be held in an exact subordination to the civil authority, and be governed by it.180 
 
While the Massachusetts provision explicitly referred to bearing arms for “common defence,” it 
conveyed this right to “the people.” 
 Several historians have found in these constitutional provisions support for their view that 
the right to bear arms was collective rather than individual.  Saul Cornell has placed particular 
emphasis on the fact that the Massachusetts constitution expressly associated the right to bear 
arms with the “common defence.” This argument, while superficially attractive, ignores the fact 
that the drafters were living in a culture where gun ownership was common; where the right to 
possess firearms was so basic to the rights of citizenship, that it was assumed without need for 
explicit reference.  Tellingly, there is no record of any demand to limit an individual right to bear 
arms. 
  This culture of gun ownership was thought to be a virtue of American society; one that 
insured that liberties would be protected.  For Jefferson, 
 …the constitutions of most of our states assert that all power is inherent in the 
 people; that they may exercise it by themselves, in all cases to which they think 
 themselves competent, or they may act by representatives, freely and equally 
 chosen; that it is their right and duty to be at all times armed; that they are entitled  
 to freedom of person; freedom of religion; freedom of property; and freedom of 
 the press. (emphasis added)181  
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The clear meaning of the text is that the right to bear arms was an individual one.  Elsewhere, he 
wrote, “What country before ever existed a century and half without a rebellion? And what 
country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people  
preserve the spirit of resistance?  Let them take arms.”182  Madison extoled the virtues of an 
armed population in Federalist 46:  
 Besides the advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the 
 people of almost every other nation, the existence of subordinate governments  
 to which the people are attached, and by which the militia officers are appointed, 
 forms a barrier against the enterprizes of ambition, more insurmountable than any  
 which a simple government of any form can admit of.  Notwithstanding the 
 military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as 
 far as the public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people 
 with arms.183 
 
 
II. The Constitution and Bill of Rights 
 
 A Constitutional Convention convened in the summer of 1787 to formulate a new 
framework of government to consolidate federal power.  The Articles of Confederation had 
severely limited federal power; most power was retained by the states.  The federal government 
could not raise taxes, could not regulate interstate commerce, and was significantly hindered in 
its ability to enforce its own laws.  This flaw was highlighted in 1786, when both the federal and 
state governments had proved ineffective in dealing with a revolt of Revolutionary War veterans  
																																																						
182 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital Edition, ed. James P. McClure and J. Jefferson 
Looney. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008-2019 
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu.libproxy.wustl.edu/founders (accessed February 15, 2019). 
183 The Papers of James Madison Digital Edition, J.C.A. Stagg, ed. Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2010. http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu.libproxy.wustl.edu/founders 
(accessed February 12, 2019). 
	 	
                 59 
in Western Massachusetts, “Shays’s Rebellion.”  The fact that local militias had taken up arms 
against the government raised alarms.  John Adams especially worried: 
 To suppose arms in the hands of citizens, to be used at individual discretion, 
 except in private self-defence, or by partial orders of towns, counties, or 
 districts of a state, is to demolish every constitution, and lay the laws prostrate, 
 so that liberty could be enjoyed by no man – it is a dissolution of the govern- 
 ment.184   
 
The founders would focus on the right to bear arms and the proper role of a militia in a free 
society in the ensuing constitutional debate. 
 The Constitution enacted by the Convention in September 1787 did not contain a bill of 
rights.  The framers recognized that the militia would play an important role in a free society, 
and much of the debate centered on how the authority over the militia would be allocated 
between the state and federal government.  In its final draft, Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution would allocate this authority, delegating to Congress the power: 
 To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union 
 suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions 
 To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for 
 governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
 States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, 
 and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by 
 Congress…185 
 
Under the Constitution, the power was divided between Congress, the President, and the states; 
Congress had the power to raise and support armies and to declare war, the President was the  
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commander and chief of the army and militia, when called upon, and the states retained the 
power to train and appoint militia officers.  Yet the Constitution did not contain a bill of rights. 
 Why not?  Defenders of the Constitution argued that there were two primary reasons.  
First, the powers delegated to the federal government were specifically defined.  Second, an 
armed population defending liberties against an oppressive government obviated the need for a  
bill of rights.  This justification was noted in several tracts written by Federalists in support of 
ratification of the Constitution.  In Federalist No. 46, Madison responded to the argument that the 
federal government could raise a standing army that would threaten liberties: 
 To [this] would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of  
 citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among 
 themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted 
 by governments possessing their affections and confidence.186 
 
Alexander Hamilton argued that there was no need for a bill of rights given that the Constitution 
did not convey any power to the federal government to infringe upon fundamental liberties, 
including freedom of speech and the right to bear arms, which were retained by the people: 
 Bills of rights are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, 
 abridgements of prerogative in favour of privilege, reservation of rights not  
 surrendered to the prince…They have no application to constitutions professedly 
 founded upon the power of the people…the people surrender nothing; and 
 as they retain everything they have no need of particular reservations.187 
 
Hamilton had earlier maintained that the fundamental right of self- defense was the ultimate 
defense against a tyrannical government: 
 If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no  
 resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense which is 
 paramount to all positive forms of government, and which against the usurpation 
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 of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success 
 than against those of the rulers of an individual state…188 
 
Noah Webster authored the first political pamphlet in support of the Constitution.  In it, he 
stressed the importance of an armed population in a manner that echoed the words of Viscount 
Molesworth almost a hundred years before: 
         
 Before a standing army can rule, the people must be disarmed; as they are  
 in almost every kingdom in Europe.  The supreme power in America cannot 
 enforce unjust laws by the sword; because the whole body of the people are 
 armed, and constitute a force superior to any band of regular troops that can 
 be, on any pretence, raised in the United State.  A military force, at the com- 
 mand of Congress, can execute no laws, but such as the people perceive to 
 be just and constitutional; for they will possess the power, and jealously will 
 instantly inspire the inclination, to resist the execution of a law which appears  
 to them unjust and oppressive.189 
 
The Federalist Trench Coxe reiterated this point: “The unlimited power of the sword is not in the 
hands of either the federal or state governments, but, where I trust in God it will ever remain, in 
the hands of the people.”190  Notwithstanding these assurances, anti-federalists persisted in 
demanding that the new constitution contain a bill of rights. 
 In the state ratification conventions that followed, anti-federalists again voiced concerns 
regarding the lack of a bill of rights.  In January 1788, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 
Georgia and Connecticut ratified the Constitution without a bill of rights.  In some of the 
conventions, certain amendments were proposed specifically addressing the right to bear arms.191  
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None of these proposed amendments were adopted.  Yet the margin in favor of ratification had 
been so close that the Federalists agreed to include a Bill of Rights after ratification was assured. 
 The language of the Second Amendment reads: “A well regulated militia being necessary 
to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be 
infringed”192  These cryptic words have been the source of considerable debate over the years, as 
historians and lawyers seek to divine the original intent of the framers. Much of the conjecture is 
attributable to the fact that the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the Second 
Amendment is relatively sparse.  Madison initially assumed the responsibility to craft a bill of 
rights.  He surveyed all of the proposed amendments produced by the various state conventions, 
consolidating some, and revising others.  The goal was to produce language that would be as 
succinct as possible and at the same time garner sufficient votes to be enacted.  His first draft of 
the second amendment provided that: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be 
infringed; a well- armed, and well- regulated militia being the best security of a free country: but 
no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in 
person.”193  The House of Representatives appointed a committee to consider the amendments, 
which changed a “free country” to a “free state,” and moved “a well- regulated militia” to the 
front of the clause addressing the right to bear arms.  The resulting language provided that “A  
																																																						
committed, or real danger of public injury from people..”  In New Hampshire, “Congress shall 
never disarm any citizen, unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion.” In Virginia, “That 
the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia, composed of the 
body of the people, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free state…”, and 
in New York, “That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated militia, 
including the body of the people capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence 
of a free state.” Halbrook, The Founders’ Second Amendment, 239. 
192 Amendment II, The Constitution of the United States. 
193 Halbrook, The Founders’ Second Amendment, 253. 
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well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, being the best security of a free state, 
the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but no person religiously 
scrupulous shall be compelled to bear arms.”194  
 The House of Representatives did not debate the infringement of the right to keep and 
bear arms.  Rather, the discussion almost entirely centered on the question of granting an  
exemption to conscientious objectors.  Elbridge Gerry was concerned that the exemption could 
be used by the government to destroy the constitution: 
 This declaration of rights, I take it, is intended to secure the people against  
 the mal-administration of the government; if we could suppose that, in all 
 cases, the rights of the people would be attended to, the occasion for guards 
 of this kind would be removed.  Now, I am apprehensive, sir, that this clause 
 would give an opportunity to the people in power to destroy the constitution 
 itself.  They can declare who are those religiously scrupulous, and prevent  
 them from bearing arms.195   
 
 He viewed an armed population as the principal line of defense against an oppressive 
government.  Representative Thomas Scott of Pennsylvania also opposed the conscientious 
objection clause, stating: “you can never depend on your militia. This will lead to the violation of 
another article in the constitution, which secures to the people the right of keeping arms, as in 
this case you must have recourse to a standing army.”196  The amendments were then sent to the 
Senate for its consideration. 
 The Senate met in secret and there is no record of its debates.  An amendment to limit the 
ability of the government to maintain a standing army was proposed but defeated.  The language  
																																																						
194 ibid., 262. 
195 House of Representatives, Amendments To The Constitution, 17, 20 Aug. 1789, in Kurland 
and Lerner, The Founders’ Constitution, 210. 
196 ibid., 211. 
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excluding the requirement to bear arms on religious grounds was removed from the House 
version, perhaps because the amendments were addressing “rights” of individuals rather than 
duties.  A proposal to add “for the common defence” after “bear arms” in the language of the 
Second Amendment was also rejected.197  The reasoning for the rejection does not survive, but it 
is interesting to note that a hundred years earlier, a similar revision to the language of Article VII 
of the English Bill of Rights was also rejected.198  Saul Cornell thinks the removal of the clause 
in terms of concern over federal overreach: “If placed in the Bill of Rights this phrase might have 
provided unscrupulous leaders with a pretext for prohibiting the militia from defending the states 
or localities from external or internal threats.”199  It is odd that he finds such significance in the 
common meaning of this phrase in the Massachusetts constitution, yet dismisses it when it was 
removed from the federal Bill of Rights.  The Senate revisions to the House Bill are reflected in 
the final version of the Second Amendment. 
 The Second Amendment has been exhaustively, indeed exhaustingly, parsed by historians 
to discern the exact relationship between the first clause specifying a well- regulated militia and 
the second calling for the right to keep and bear arms.  Some argue that the right is collective in 
that the first clause specifies the purpose for establishing the right.  Nowhere in the sparse 
legislative history of the amendment, they say, is there any debate regarding the right of the 
individual to keep and bear arms for non-military purposes, including self-defense and hunting.  
But the one hundred fifty- year history of the development of the right suggests otherwise. It was 
so obvious to the political leaders of the day that the issue was never even raised.  Everything we  
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198 See footnote 54. 
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know of how contemporaries wrote and spoke about the right suggests that it was assumed.  
George Washington, in a speech before Congress, stated: “To be prepared for war, is one of the 
most effectual means of preserving peace.  A free people ought not only to be armed, but 
disciplined; to which end, a uniform and well digested plan is requisite.”200  Thomas Jefferson 
wrote: “all power is inherent in the people… that it is their right and duty to be at all times  
armed; that they are entitled to freedom of person; freedom of religion freedom of property; and 
freedom of the press.”201  Joseph Story summarized the Second Amendment as follows: 
 The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered, as 
 the palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check 
 against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers, and will generally, even if 
 these are successful in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph 
 over them.202 
 
That view, expressed in his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, remains 
compelling.  An armed population was viewed by the founders as the greatest defense of 
American liberties against an oppressive government.  No subsequent jurisprudence has 
seriously dislodged an individual right to bear arms that long predated the birth of the nation.    
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                                         Conclusion 
  The historical basis for interpreting an individual right to keep and bear arms is deeply 
rooted in both English common law and the development of English political and legal 
philosophy over the course of one hundred and fifty years.  The drafters of the U.S. constitution 
lived in a society in which gun ownership for a multitude of purposes was quite common.  It was 
one in which the right to use arms in self- defense was assumed.  
 From where was this right derived?  As the records of Boston Massacre trials 
demonstrate, the English common law and natural rights theory firmly established a fundamental 
right of self-preservation, which under the exigencies of the situation might be exercised through 
the use of firearms.  Hobbes, Locke, and a long line of English jurists stressed that the right was 
possessed by the individual, the residue of those ceded to society in the state of nature.  Their 
works were readily accessible and frequently cited by both the political elite and the ordinary 
person in colonial America.  Inspired by the works of Whig political theorists, the founders were 
inculcated with the idea that it was incumbent upon each individual citizen to possess arms as a 
bulwark against the threat to liberties posed by a tyrannical government.  This is repeatedly 
demonstrated by the multiple references in pre-revolutionary political literature and the 
commentary surrounding the drafting of the constitution.   
 The language of the Second Amendment is admittedly opaque and its legislative history 
sparse.  Those who advocate for a collective view of the right to keep and bear arms primarily 
base their position on the fact that the record of debate centered on the role and governance of 
the militia and lacked any discussion of the rights to bear arms for non-military purposes. This 
argument implies that the founding fathers sought to limit the rights granted in the English Bill of  
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Rights, rather than expand them.   Yet the drafters of the constitution lived in a society where 
gun ownership was quite common, where a firearm was used just as readily for hunting and 
defending oneself as for service in a militia.  They contemplated an individual right to bear arms, 
to protect themselves, their property, and if necessary, in the common defense.  This right was 
self-evident and noncontroversial.    
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